

**ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING  
PORTUCEL – EMPRESA PRODUTORA DE PASTA E PAPEL, S.A.  
APRIL 10<sup>th</sup> 2012**

**PROPOSAL RELATING TO ITEM SIX  
ON THE AGENDA**

**STATEMENT ON THE REMUNERATION POLICY  
FOR THE MEMBERS OF PORTUCEL'S MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISORY BODIES  
FOR SUBMISSION TO THE GENERAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS OF APRIL 10<sup>th</sup> 2012**

*I. Introduction*

Portucel's Remuneration Committee drew up a remuneration policy statement for the first time in 2008, successfully submitting it for approval by the company's general meeting that year. This statement was drafted in line with a recommendation issued on this matter by the Securities Market Commission (*Comissão de Mercado de Valores Mobiliários*).

The Remuneration Committee declared at this time that it felt that the options set out in the statement should be maintained until the end of the term of office of the company's officers then underway. This term ran from 2007 to 2010.

It was then necessary to review the statement in 2010 in the light of the provisions of Law 28/2009, of 19 June, requiring the Remuneration Committee to submit a remuneration policy statement each year to the General Meeting.

It remains the view of this Committee that, as a set of principles, the remuneration policy statement should be kept stable throughout the term of office of the company officers, unless exceptional or unforeseen circumstances require a change. Moreover, given that the Remuneration Committee has been re-elected for another term of office, running until 2014, it continues to make sense that this stability be maintained, except in the possible case of the circumstances mentioned, which have not so far occurred.

We have therefore opted to proposal for approval a statement with the same content as that currently in force.

There is a significant divide between the two most common systems for setting the remuneration of company officers. The first is for such remuneration to be set by the general meeting; this solution is rarely adopted, being rather impractical for a variety of reasons. The second is for remuneration to be set by a Committee, which decides in keeping with criteria on which the shareholders have not had the opportunity to pronounce.

The solution now before us amounts to an intermediate system whereby the shareholders can appraise a remuneration policy to be followed by the Committee. This seeks to draw on the best features of both theoretical systems, as we propose to do in this document, reasserting the position we have previously defended whilst also including the contribution from the additional experience and expertise acquired by the company, and complying with the new legal requirements in this field as referred to above.

## II. Legal requirements and recommendations

This statement is issued in the legal framework formed by Law 28/2009, of 19 June (as referred to above), and the recommendations of the Securities Market Commission set out in the Corporate Governance Code issued by the Commission.

In addition to rules on the frequency with which the statement must be issued and approved and on disclosure of its content, this law also stipulates that this content should include information on:

- a) *Arrangements for aligning the interests of members of the management body with those of the company;*
- b) *Criteria for setting the variable component of remuneration;*
- c) *The existence of share or share option pay schemes for members of the management and supervisory bodies;*
- d) *The possibility of the variable component of remuneration, if any, being paid, wholly or in part, after the accounts have been finalized for the entire term of office;*
- e) *Rules limiting variable limitation in the event of the company's results revealing significant deterioration in the company's performance in the last period for which accounts are closed or when such deterioration may be expected in the period underway.*

The current recommendations of the Securities Market Commission make the following requirements:

*II.1.5.2. In addition to the content referred to in Article 2 of Law 28/2009, of 19 June, the statement on remuneration policy for the management and supervisory bodies referred to in the same article should contain sufficient information on: i) which corporate groups were chosen for the purposes of comparing remuneration policies and practices with a view to setting remuneration; ii) severance pay for directors.*

*II.1.5.3. The remuneration policy statement referred to in Article 2 of Law 28/2009 should also cover the pay of management personnel as defined by Article 248-B.3 of the Securities Code, when such pay includes a significant variable component. The statement should be detailed and the policy presented should take into account, namely, the company's long term performance, compliance with the rules applicable to the company's business activities and restraint in risk-taking.*

## III. Rules deriving from law and the articles of association

Any remuneration system must inevitably take into account both the general legal rules and the particular rules established in the articles of association, if any.

The legal rules for the directors are basically established in Article 399 of the Companies Code, from which it follows that:

- Powers to fix the remuneration lie with the general meeting of shareholders of a committee appointed by the same.

- The remuneration is to be fixed in accordance with the duties performed and the company's state of affairs.
- Remuneration may be fixed, or may consist in part of a percentage of the profits for the period, but the maximum percentage to be allocated to the directors must be authorized by a clause in the articles of association, and shall not apply to distribution of reserves or any part of the profits for the period which could not, under the law, be distributed to shareholders.

For the Audit Board and the officers of the General Meeting, the law states that the remuneration shall consist of a fixed amount, determined in the same way by the general meeting, or by a committee appointed by the same, in accordance with the duties performed and the company's state of affairs.

For the members of the Audit Board and the officers of the General Meeting, the law lays down that the remuneration shall consist of a fixed sum, which shall be determined in the same way by the general meeting of shareholders or by a committee appointed by the same, taking into account the duties performed and the state of the company's affairs.

A specific clause in Portucel's articles of association (article no. 21) provides that the remuneration of directors may be differentiated. The second paragraph of this clause lays down that the General Meeting may issue rules on pension plans and complementary pension schemes for directors.

This is the formal framework to be observed in defining remuneration policy.

#### *IV. Historical background*

From the company's transformation into a limited liability company in 1991 and through to 2004, the remuneration of all of Portucel's directors consisted of a fixed component, payable fourteen times a year, and set by a Remuneration Committee, and of a variable component, determined annually, depending on the specific circumstances, by decision of the State, as shareholder.

After the first phase of privatization in 2004, the formal principle was first instituted of remuneration being divided into fixed and variable components, the latter being based on the company's results and the specific performance of each director.

This procedure has been repeated annually since 2004, with directors receiving fixed remuneration and also a variable component.

Since the incorporation of the company, members of the Audit Board have received fixed monthly remuneration. In the case of the officers of the General Meeting, since remuneration for these officers was first instituted it has been set on the basis of the number of meetings actually held.

#### *V. General Principles*

The general principles to be observed when setting the remuneration of the company officers are essentially those which in very general terms derive from the law: on the one hand, the duties performed and on the other the state of the company's affairs. If we add to these the general market terms for similar situations, we find that these appear to be the three main general principles:

a) Duties performed.

It is necessary to consider the duties performed by each company officer not only in the formal sense, but also in the broader sense of the work carried out and the associated responsibilities. Not all the executive directors are in the same position, and the same is also true, for example, of the members of the audit board. Duties have to be assessed in the broadest sense, taking into account criteria as varied as, for example, responsibility, time dedicated, or the added value to the company resulting from a given type of intervention or representation of a given institution.

The fact that time is spent by the officer on duties in other controlled companies also cannot be taken out of the equation, due, on the one hand, to the added responsibility this represents, and, on the other hand, to the existence of another source of income.

It should be noted that Portucel's experience has shown that the directors of this company, contrary to what is often observed in other companies of the same time, cannot be neatly split into executive and non-executive. There are a number of directors with delegated powers and who are generally referred to as executive directors, but some of directors without delegated powers are closely involved in the life of the company in a variety of ways. These are essential aspects which must inevitably be considered when setting remuneration.

b) The state of the company's affairs.

This criterion must also be understood and interpreted with care. The size of the company and the inevitable complexity of the associated management responsibilities, is clearly one of the relevant aspects of the state of affairs, understood in the broadest sense. There are implications here for the need to remunerate a responsibility which is greater in larger companies with complex business models and for the capacity to remunerate management duties appropriately.

d) Market criteria.

It is unavoidably necessary to match supply to demand when setting any level of pay, and the officers of a corporation are no exception. Only respect for market practices makes it possible to keep professionals of a calibre required for the complexity of the duties performed and the responsibilities shouldered, thereby assuring not only their own interests but essentially those of the company, and the generation of value of all its shareholders. In the case of Portucel, in view of its characteristics and size, the market criteria to be considered are those prevailing internationally, as well as those to be observed in Portugal.

## *VI. Compliance with legal requirements and recommendations*

Having described the historical background and the general principles adopted, we shall now consider the issue of compliance by these principles with the relevant legal requirements.

1. Article 2 a) of Law 28/2009. Alignment of interests.

The first requirement that Law 28/2009 regards as essential in terms of the information in this statement is for a description of the procedures which assure that the directors' interests are aligned with those of the company.

We believe that the remuneration system adopted in Portucel is successful in assuring such alignment. Firstly, because the remuneration sets out to be fair and equitable in the light of the principles set out, and secondly because it links the directors to results by means of a variable remuneration component which is set primarily in the light of these results.

2. Article 2 b) of Law 28/2009. Criteria for the variable component.

The second requirement established by the law is for information on the criteria used to determine the variable component.

The company's results are the most important factor in setting the variable remuneration: not the results seen as an absolute value, but as viewed from a critical perspective in the light of what may be expected of a company of this size and characteristics, and in view of the actual market conditions.

In setting the variable component, other factors are also considered, resulting in the main from the general principles - market, specific duties, the state of the company's affairs. These factors are often more individual, relating to the specific position and performance of each director.

3. Article 2 c) of Law 28/2009. Share or option plans.

The decision whether or not to provide share or option plans is structural in nature. The existence of such a plan is not a simple add-on to an existing remuneration system, but rather an underlying to change to the existing system, at least in terms of the variable remuneration.

Although a remuneration system of this type is not incompatible with the company's articles of association, we feel that the wording of the relevant provisions in the articles and the historical background to the existing system argue in favour of maintaining a remuneration system without any share or option component.

This is not to say that we see no merits in including a share or option component in directors' remuneration, nor that we would not be receptive to restructuring directors' remuneration to incorporate such a plan. However, such a component is not essential in order to promote the principles we defend and, as we have said, we do not believe that this was the fundamental intention of the company's shareholders.

4. Article 2 d) of Law 28/2009. Date of payment of variable remuneration.

Specialists in this field have drawn attention to significant advantages in deferring payment of the variable component of remuneration to a date when the entire period corresponding to the term of office can in some way be appraised.

We accept this principle as theoretically sound, but it appears to us to offer few advantages in the specific case of Portucel and other similar companies.

One of the main arguments supporting this system is that directors should be committed to achieving sustainable medium-term results, and that the remuneration system should support this, avoiding a situation where remuneration is pegged simply to one financial year, which may not be representative, and which may present higher profits at the cost of worse results in subsequent years.

However, whilst this danger is real and is worth safeguarding against by means of systems such as this in companies where the capital is completely dispersed and the directors may be tempted to take a short term view, maximizing quick results by sacrificing long term potential, this does not correspond to the situation in a company such as Portucel, with a stable shareholder structure and management, where these concerns are inherently less of an issue.

5. Article 2 e) of Law 28/2009. Procedures for capping variable remuneration.

Procedures of this kind are designed to limit variable remuneration in the event of the results showing a significant deterioration in the company's performance in the last reporting period or when such a deterioration may be expected in the period underway.

This type of provision also reflects a concern that good performance in the short term, which may boost directors' remuneration, could be achieved at the cost of future performance.

For obvious reasons, the arguments presented above also apply here. It should also be noted that a system of this kind would have little practical effect if not combined with significant deferral of remuneration, which is not proposed for Portucel.

6. First part of Recommendation II.1.5.2.. Comparative information.

In relation to groups of companies whose remuneration policies and practices have been taken as the baseline for setting remuneration, this Committee took into consideration, to the extent of the information accessible, all Portuguese companies of equivalent size, namely PSI-20 companies, and also companies in international markets with characteristics similar to those of Portucel.

7. Second part of Recommendation II.1.5.2.. Termination and severance pay.

There are no agreements, and no such provisions have been defined by this Committee, on payments by Portucel relating to dismissal or termination by agreement of Directors' duties.

8. Recommendation II.1.5.3. Inclusion of managers in this statement.

The Remuneration Committee has no proposal or statement to make on this issue, as it is the express understanding of the Board of Directors that it has sole powers over this matter and that it is not in the company's interest to comply with this recommendation.

## VII. *Specific Options*

The specific options for the remuneration policy we propose are as follows:

1. The remuneration of executive directors shall comprise a fixed component and a variable component.
2. The remuneration of non-executive directors shall comprise only a fixed component, or else a fixed component and a variable component, as for executive directors, whenever justified by the nature of the duties actually exercised and their degree of responsibility and involvement in the day to day running of the company.
3. The remuneration of the members of the Audit Board and the officers of the General Meeting shall comprise a fixed component only.
4. The fixed component of the remuneration of directors shall consist of a monthly amount payable fourteen times a year or of a pre-set amount for each meeting of the Board of Directors attended.
5. A monthly rate shall be set for the fixed component of the remuneration of directors for all those who are members of the Executive Board and those who, although not members of such Board, perform duties or carry out specific work of a repeated or ongoing nature.
6. The pre-set amount for participation in members of the Board of Directors shall be fixed for those who have duties which are essentially advisory and supervisory.
7. The fixed remuneration of the members of the Audit Board shall consist in all cases of a pre-set amount paid fourteen times a year.
8. The fixed remuneration of the officers of the General Meeting shall consist in all cases of a pre-set amount for each meeting, the remuneration for second and subsequent meetings being lower than that for the first general meeting of the year.
9. In setting all remuneration, including in particular the distribution of the total amount allocated to the variable remuneration of the Board of Directors, the general principles established above shall be observed: the duties performed, the state of the company's affairs and market criteria.

#### The Remuneration Committee

Chairman: Egon Zehnder, represented by José Gonalo Maury  
Member: Frederico Jos  da Cunha Mendona e Meneses  
Member: Jo o Rodrigo Appleton Moreira Rato